Specialisation, Interdisciplinarity, and Incommensurability

Incommensurability may be regarded as driving specialisation, on the one hand, and as posing some problems to interdisciplinarity, on the other hand. It may be argued, however, that incommensurability plays no role in either specialisation or interdisciplinarity. Scientific specialties could be defined as simply 'different' (that is, about different things), rather than 'incommensurable' (that is, competing for the explanation of the same phenomena). Interdisciplinarity could be viewed as the co- ordinated effort of scientists possessing complemetary and interlocking skills, and not as the overcoming of some sort of incommensurable divide. This article provides a comprehensive evaluative examination of the relations between specialisation, interdisciplinarity, and incommensurability. Its aim is to defend the relevance of incommensurability to both specialisation and interdisciplinarity. At the same time, it aims at correcting the tendency, common among many philosophers, to regard incommensurability in a restrictive manner - such as, for example, as an almost purely semantic issu

Scientific revolutions, specialization and the discovery of the structure of DNA: toward a new picture of the development of the sciences

In his late years, Thomas Kuhn became interested in the process of scientific specialization, which does not seem to possess the destructive element that is characteristic of scientific revolutions. It therefore makes sense to investigate whether and how Kuhn’s insights about specialization are consistent with, and actually fit, his model of scientific progress through revolutions. In this paper, I argue that the transition toward a new specialty corresponds to a revolutionary change for the group of scientists involved in such a transition. I will clarify the role of the scientific community in revolutionary changes and characterize the incommensurability across specialties as possessing both semantic and methodological aspects. The discussion of the discovery of the structure of DNA will serve both as an illustration of my main argument and as reply to one criticism raised against Kuhn—namely, that his model cannot capture cases of revolutionary yet non-disruptive episodes of scientific progress. Revisiting Kuhn’s ideas on specialization will shed new light on some often overlooked features of scientific change

The interdisciplinarity revolution

Contemporary interdisciplinary research is often described as bringing some important changes in the structure and aims of the scientific enterprise. Sometimes, it is even characterized as a sort of Kuhnian scientific revolution. In this paper, the analogy between interdisciplinarity and scientific revolutions will be analysed. It will be suggested that the way in which interdisciplinarity is promoted looks similar to how new paradigms were described and defended in some episodes of revolutionary scientific change. However, contrary to what happens during some scientific revolutions, the rhetoric with which interdisciplinarity is promoted does not seem to be accompanied by a strong agreement about what interdisciplinarity actually is. In the end, contemporary interdisciplinarity could be defined as being in a ‘pre-paradigmatic’ phase, with the very talk promoting interdisciplinarity being a possible obstacle to its maturity.; La investigación contemporánea sobre la interdisciplinariedad es descrita a menudo como si implicara cambios importantes en la estructura y fines de la empresa científica. A veces es incluso caracterizada como una forma de revolución científica kuhniana. En este artículo se analizará la analogía entre la interdisciplinariedad y las revoluciones científicas. Se sugerirá que el modo en que se promueve la interdisciplinariedad es similar al modo en que se describe y defiende un nuevo paradigma en algunos episodios de cambio científico revolucionario. Sin embargo, al contrario de lo que sucede durante las revoluciones científicas, la retórica con la que se promueve la interdisciplinariedad no parece venir acompañada por un fuerte acuerdo acerca de lo que es realmente dicha interdisciplinariedad. En definitiva, la interdisciplinariedad contemporánea se encuentra en una fase pre-paradigmática, siendo un posible obstáculo para su madurez el discurso mismo que promueve la interdisciplinariedad

Guest editor’s introduction

Guest editor's introduction to the special issue on "Questions about science"

The interdisciplinarity revolution

Contemporary interdisciplinary research is often described as bringing some important changes in the structure and aims of the scientific enterprise. Sometimes, it is even characterized as a sort of Kuhnian scientific revolution. In this paper, the analogy between interdisciplinarity and scientific revolutions will be analysed. It will be suggested that the way in which interdisciplinarity is promoted looks similar to how new paradigms were described and defended in some episodes of revolutionary scientific change. However, contrary to what happens during some scientific revolutions, the rhetoric with which interdisciplinarity is promoted does not seem to be accompanied by a strong agreement about what interdisciplinarity actually is. In the end, contemporary interdisciplinarity could be defined as being in a 'pre-paradigmatic' phase, with the very talk promoting interdisciplinarity being a possible obstacle to its maturity

Formal models of the scientific community and the value-ladenness of science

In the past few years, several formal models of the social organisation of science have been developed. While their robustness and representational adequacy has been analysed at length, the function of these models has begun to be discussed in more general terms only recently. This paper is a contribution to the general philosophical debate on the formal models of the social organisation of science. Its aim is to understand which view of science these models end up supporting as a consequence of their philosophical presuppositions, which are also in need to be explicated. It will be argued that, because of some of their philosophical underpinnings, current formal models of the scientific community do not explain the internal role that moral and societal values play in scientific research. It will also be discussed whether formal models of the social organization of science can actually capture the value-ladenness of science. At the same time, it will be shown that the discussion on the formal models of the scientific community may contribute in fruitful ways to the ongoing discussions about value judgements in science

The Distribution of Ethical Labor in the Scientific Community

To believe that every single scientist ought to be individually engaged in ethical thinking in order for science to be responsible at a collective level may be too demanding, if not plainly unrealistic. In fact, ethical labor is typically distributed across different kinds of scientists within the scientific community. Based on the empirical data collected within the Horizon 2020 ‘RRI-Practice’ project, we propose a classification of the members of the scientific community depending on their engagement in this collective activity. Our classification offers, on the one hand, a model of how the ethical aspects of science are taken into consideration by scientists and, on the other, some indications on how to institutionalize ethics in science

Beyond Structure: New Frontiers of the Philosophy of Thomas Kuhn

Thomas Kuhn (1922-1996) is widely considered as one of the most important philosophers of science of the 20th century, while his The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (SSR) is regarded as one of the most influential works in the philosophy of science. At the same time, however, his place within philosophy of science remains ambiguous. On the one hand, despite the popularity of SSR, there is no proper ‘Kuhnian school of thought’ in HPS. On the other hand, the interest towards Kuhn does not seem to fade away and the number of publications about his work does not seem to decrease. We suggest that there are at least three different ways to go ‘beyond SSR’: (i) by scrutinising the development of Kuhn’s thought, from his pre- to his post-SSR writings; (ii) by contextualising Kuhn in the philosophical milieu of his time, thus interpreting his view as emerging from the intellectual exchanges he had with contemporary philosophers; (iii) by reinterpreting and developing some of his most known ideas, in ways that perhaps Kuhn himself was not able to contemplate